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INTRODUCTION
In 1979, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) accountable to its internal tribal
consultation policy in Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus.1
This holding contradicted the Administrative Procedure Act’s
(APA) general rule that an agency’s internal policy and guidance
are not judicially enforceable.2 It also established a precedent that
supported a small line of cases that held similarly—in some
circumstances, Eighth Circuit courts have forced agencies to
follow their internal guidance when it comes to dealing with Indian
tribes.
*

Copyright 2015 John Robinson Jr., J.D. 2014, University of Utah College of
Law. John practices natural resources law in Salt Lake City. Contact him at
mainerobinson@gmail.com.
1
Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979).
2
See infra Part II.
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This Article examines the Eighth Circuit’s divergence from
normative judicial enforcement under the APA and the
ramifications thereof. This divergence has only been applied in
narrow circumstances so far, namely, where an Indian tribe is the
party seeking enforcement and the defendant agency has a
consultation policy that applies to the situation. In such
circumstances, federal common law attaches to the agency action
through the Indian trust doctrine3 and results in judicial
enforcement where there otherwise would be none. In this way,
federal common law trumps the APA, a concept that this Article
designates the binding guidance principle (“the Principle”).
After analyzing the Eighth Circuit’s jurisprudence and
explaining the Principle, this Article asks whether Indian tribes can
expand the Principle to provide protection against adverse agency
action outside of the tribal consultation context. For instance, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated an
Environmental Justice Policy in 2010 (“EJ Policy”) in which it
sought to avoid unfair treatment of indigenous populations.4 Under
a typical APA analysis, this document would merely provide
guidance to the EPA and would not create rights for Indian
tribes— the EPA may strive to act in accordance with the policy,
but the policy does not force it to do so. This Article uses the
EPA’s EJ Policy as a foil, and suggests that tribes should leverage
the Principle to render the EJ Policy, or policies similar to the EJ
policy, enforceable.
To those ends, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I
addresses background material and focuses on how the Indian trust
doctrine arose, why it is important, and the canons of the doctrine
itself. Part II examines the judicial enforceability of agency policy
and guidance generally. It then explains the Indian trust doctrine’s
affect on judicial enforcement of agency policy in the Eighth
Circuit. That analysis also shows the genesis and application of the
Principle. Finally, part III distills a succinct rule and evidences

3

See infra Part I.B (explaining the Indian Trust Doctrine).
OFFICE OF POLICY, ECON. & INNOVATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
INTERIM GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE DURING THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACTION (July 2010),
http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nepa/includes/considering_ej_in_rulemaking_guide07
2010.pdf [hereinafter EJ POLICY].
4
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how the Principle allows tribes to hold more agencies
accountable to more of their policy and guidance documents.
I. BACKGROUND
Federal Indian law describes the body of law developed to deal
with the relationship between the federal government, the Indian
tribes, and the states. Indian law generally, however, may reference
non-federal sources: tribal law, international law, executive orders,
treaties that predate the Constitution, and state law.5 Under this
umbrella, federal common law treats Indian tribes as “domestic,
dependent nations”—domestic because they exist within the
borders of the United States and dependent because they are
subject to United States’ power.6 However, Indian tribes retain
some trappings of sovereign nationhood because they exercise
many police powers within their own boundaries.7
This part proceeds in two sections. First, section A provides a
brief history of white colonial expansion and its effects on the
Indian population. Indeed, “Indian law and history are the opposite
sides of the same coin.”8 That history is requisite for understanding
the Indian trust doctrine itself, explained in section B below.
A. Historical Perspective: European Interaction with Indian
Peoples
Historical perspective gives context to the philosophical
underpinnings of Indian law. Context is of central importance to
Indian law because the Indian trust doctrine developed in direct
response to the horrible treatment of Indian populations in the
Americas. Indeed, history is the “most significant” source within
the “wealth of seemingly non-legal data [that] affects the legal
relationship between Indians and the federal government.”9

5

See FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§1–2 (2012 ed.).
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). For instance, Indian tribes
cannot negotiate with foreign nations on a government-to-government basis—
for such purposes they are considered under the jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.; see also COHEN, supra note 5.
7
See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16 (explaining that the relationship between
Indians and the U.S. “is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in
existence”).
8
COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.01.
9
Id.
6
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European justification for colonization in the “New World”
extends back at least to the Crusades, when the Vatican announced
a papal right to use force against non-Christian peoples.10 Implicit
in this papal right, was the Church’s condonation of taking nonChristian lands by the sword. Somewhat later, in the wake of
heinous Portuguese and Spanish brutality in the New World,11 a
Dominican theologian named de Victoria argued against and
changed somewhat the earlier attitude. Under de Victoria’s new
analysis, legal acquisition and political domination of Indian lands
required the prior consent of the Indian tribes.12 Essentially, de
Victoria rejected the notion that European powers could simply
take the land they wanted by force. He also rejected the idea that
the Indians held no right to their land simply because they were
non-Christian.13 Accordingly, simple discovery of the Indian lands
alone did not convey complete title and ownership to the
“discoverer” under de Victoria’s theory.14
Chief Justice Marshall explained this theory—the doctrine of
discovery—in Johnson v. M’Intosh.15 In that case, Chief Justice
Marshall explained, “the great nations of Europe were eager to
appropriate to themselves” as much of the New World as they
could.16 They assumed that “the superior genius of Europe might
claim an ascendency” over the Indians, which they justified by
“convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to the
[Indians] by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity.”17
However, said Chief Justice Marshall, the European nations
needed some way to avoid constant war amongst themselves as
they all sought fulfillment of the same goal—acquisition of the
extensive, newly discovered lands.18 To that end, they needed to

10

Id. § 1.02.
HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492–PRESENT
7 (Twentieth Anniversary ed. 1999) (quoting the priest Las Casas, who wrote
that, by 1508, European occupation of Hispaniola had resulted in over 3 million
Indian deaths).
12
COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.02.
13
Id.
14
COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.02. On the other hand, a European power could gain
land through a “just” war such as when an Indian tribe was the aggressor. Id.
15
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 576 (1823).
16
Id. at 572.
17
Id. at 573.
18
Id.
11
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establish a common principle that all the nations would
follow. “This principle was, that discovery gave title to the
government by [whom] it was made.”19 However, acquiring title
by discovery only worked to exclude the other European powers
from the land—the Indians still held “a legal as well as just claim
to retain possession of [their land].”20 Thus, the doctrine of
discovery vested title to the discovered lands in the discoverer, but
did not grant a possessory interest—European ownership was
subject to “the Indian right of occupancy.”21
Since the doctrine of discovery only gives the discoverer title,
and not possession, European states still had to physically acquire
the lands from the Indians by moving in on their land and taking
possession of it. This idea, that Indians retained some, although
limited, legal right to land colored dealings with the Indian tribes
throughout the colonial and expansionist eras. Indeed, the earliest
reservations, “which were steadily reduced in size,” arose out of
peace treaties that (at least facially) respected an Indian right to
land.22
White settlers also bought Indian lands through trade by
offering “new weapons, new drinks, and new tools, all of which
were capable of destroying Indian life, health, and culture.”23
Acquiring Indian lands “[i]n exchange for these deadly but
apparently irresistible gifts” was seemingly easy.24 However, these
manipulative methods of gaining land necessarily stimulated
resentment and animosity amongst the Indian tribes, and hostilities
ensued. To appease the tribes and restore peace, the British
government released the Royal Proclamation of 1763,25 which
reserved all lands west of the Appalachian Mountains to the
19

Id.
Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
21
Id. But see Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of
the United States, 31 GEO. L. J. 1, 7 (1942) (“These are subtleties of feudal legal
theory which meant nothing to the Indians.”).
22
BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, THE NATIVE PEOPLES OF NORTH AMERICA: A HISTORY
120 (2005).
23
Cohen, supra note 21, at 6.
24
Id.
25
The Royal Proclamation - October 7, 1763, THE AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/proc1763.asp (“[A]nd whereas great
Frauds and Abuses have been committed in purchasing Lands of the Indians, to
the great Prejudice of our Interests, and to the great Dissatisfaction of the said
Indians.”).
20
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Indians and proscribed further land deals with the tribes.
Unfortunately, the Proclamation’s edicts did not last long.
After the American Revolutionary War, federalism issues
continued to confuse relations between the Indians and the
European settlers. The federal government strove for a
conservative Indian policy, but the states remained eager to acquire
Indian lands.26 This federalist dynamic eventually resulted in
article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution—the Congress
shall have the power to regulate commerce with the Indian
Tribes;27 Congress did just that. The federal government’s
constitutional authority displaced the states and allowed it to take
the lead in dealings with the tribes.
However, even those federal Indian treaties imbued with moral
and legal force often went unfulfilled because the government was
often unwilling to prevent states from violating the tribes’ treaty
rights.28 During the early and middle 1800s, a states’ rights
movement was on the rise, which President Jackson generally
supported.29 The states felt that they did not need to comply with
federal mandates and proclamations. Soon after Jackson assumed
the presidency, Southern states began to pass laws encroaching on
Indian sovereignty. These laws did away with the tribal unit and
imposed taxes, while denying Indians the right to vote and
encouraging whites to settle on Indian land.30 Georgia, in
particular, tried to completely evict the Cherokee Indians from
within its borders.
The Tribe fought back in federal court. Cherokee Nation v.
State of Georgia31 was the first major case to deal with Indian
26

COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.02.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.02, (comparing the
Indian powers granted to the federal government in the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution).
28
See COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.03. Additionally, not all treaties even had moral
and legal force. “Treaties were sometimes consummated by methods amounting
to bribery, or signed by representatives of only small parts of the signatory
tribes.” Id. (citing FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE
HISTORY OF A POLITICAL ANOMALY (1997)).
29
See Matthew S. Brogdon, Defending the Union: Andrew Jackson’s
Nullification Proclamation and American Federalism, 73 REV. POL. 245 (2011)
(reconciling Jackson’s advocacy of states’ rights with his Nullification
Proclamation).
30
ZINN, supra note 11, at 133.
31
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
27
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rights and marked the beginning of the Indian trust doctrine.
In it, the Cherokees sought to enjoin Georgia and its officers from
enforcing the newly passed anti-Indian laws.32 The Cherokees
cited a long list of treaties, all of which supported the Cherokee
Nation’s “exclusive right to their [own] territory, and the exclusive
right of self government within that territory.”33 The tribe also
alleged a long list of wrongs perpetrated by Georgia which if
combined would “annihilate the Cherokees as a political society,
and seize, for the use of Georgia, the lands of the nation which
have been assured to them by the United States in solemn treaties
repeatedly made and still in force.”34
Under Georgia’s new anti-Cherokee law, “the lands within the
boundary of the Cherokee territory [were] to be surveyed, and to
be distributed by lottery among the people of Georgia.”35 The
Cherokees pleaded that, unless the court granted them relief from
the anti-Cherokee law, only three alternatives remained: they
would need to either surrender their land and doom their
civilization, give up their sovereignty and rights, or “arm
themselves in defenses [sic] of these sacred rights, and fall sword
in hand, on the graves of their fathers.”36
In response, Chief Justice Marshall bluntly stated, “a case
better calculated to excite [the Court’s sympathies] can scarcely be
imagined.”37 Despite these alleged sympathies, he found that the
court did not have original jurisdiction to hear the case.38 In order
to arrive at that decision, Chief Justice Marshall examined the
relationship between the Indian tribes and the United States.39
Although the Indian nations had some familiar trappings of a
32

Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 4. In all, the complaint alleged that at least eight treaties existed between
the Cherokees and British, its colonies, or the United States. Id. at 4–5.
34
Id. at 15.
35
Id. at 13. In fact, by the time Cherokee Nation actually came before the Court,
a Cherokee Indian had been arrested, tried, and executed under Georgia law. To
illustrate the contentiousness of the moment, Georgia hanged him in direct and
open defiance of a writ of error to the state supreme court from Chief Justice
Marshall himself. Id. at 12-13 (“[The state court] promptly resolved, in
substance, that the supreme court [sic] of the United States had no jurisdiction
over the subject, and advised the immediate execution of the prisoner.”).
36
Id. at 10–11.
37
Id. at 15.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 16–18.
33
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foreign state, the “condition of the Indians in relation to the United
States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in
existence.”40 Instead of existing as foreign nations, the Indian
nations “may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic
dependent nations . . . meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage.
Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian”41 Because the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign nation
cognizable under the Constitution, the Court dismissed the case for
want of jurisdiction—“If it be true that the Cherokee nation have
rights, this is not the tribunal in which those rights are to be
asserted.”42
Chief Justice Marshall’s language in Cherokee Nation forked
into two distinct prongs. First, his comparison of the federal
government’s association with Indian tribes as a guardian-to-ward
relationship established the idea that the government owed a
fiduciary duty to the tribes. This was the first acknowledgement of
what later became known as the Indian trust doctrine.
In stark contrast, the second prong of Marshall’s decision—the
abdication of jurisdiction over Indian disputes with states—gave
President Jackson the perfect tactic for Indian repression and
removal. According to this reasoning, the federal government was
not breaking its solemn word to the Indians when it failed to
intervene in that repression and removal; the government was able
to claim that it was powerless to assist the Indians in defending
themselves against the states in the divided federalist system.43 As
President Jackson’s Secretary of War stated, “It is not your Great
Father [the President] who does this; but the laws of the Country,
which he and every one of his people is bound to regard.”44 Based
on this reasoning, the federal government would not force Indians
to move westward because that would violate federal treaties.
However, the federals warned, if Indians did not go west, state
laws would apply, destroy the Indian’s tribal and personal rights,
and render them “subject to endless harassment and invasion by

40

Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
42
Id. at 20.
43
See generally COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.03.
44
ZINN, supra note 11, at 133 (quoting Secretary of War Jon Eaton).
41
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white settlers coveting their land.”45
Without the protections offered in treaty by the federal
government, whites displaced the Indians east of the Mississippi
under color of state law.46 As the process that continued across the
continent, tribes were pushed west, isolated on small and remote
reservations, and harassed. By the late 1800s, there was no place
left for Indian; to be put and “there was little sympathy for the
preservation of [their] way of life.”47 Congress then shifted its
efforts to assimilating Indians into white society, a process that
resulted in the transfer of another 90 million acres away from the
tribes into private hands, as well as a mass destruction of tribal
culture.48 This historical lens colored and controlled development
of the Indian trust doctrine.
B. The Indian Trust Doctrine in Short
At the core, the Indian trust doctrine originates from tribal
sovereignty that preexisted white settlement of this continent49 and
“the unique trust relationship between the United States and the
Indians.”50 The trust relationship grows out of early Supreme Court
jurisprudence discussed above and encompasses the rules by which
courts interpret treaties and agreements with the tribes, as well as
federal statutes and executive orders. The doctrine includes the
following four canons:
1. Courts give liberal construction to treaties, laws, and
statutes in favor of the Indians;51
2. Courts resolve ambiguities in documents in favor of the
Indians;52
3. Courts construe agreements as the Indians would have
understood them at the time of the agreement;53
45

ZINN, supra note 11, at 133.
See generally COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.03.
47
COHEN, supra note 5, § 1.04.
48
Id.
49
Id. § 1.01.
50
Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985).
51
E.g., Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. at 247 (“[I]t is well established that
treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians.”).
52
E.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970) (“[A]ny
doubtful expressions in [documents] should be resolved in the Indians' favor.”).
53
E.g., Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 631 (“[T]his Court has often held that
treaties with the Indians must be interpreted as they would have understood
46
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4. Statutes preserve Indian property rights and sovereignty
unless Congress clearly intended otherwise.54
The guardian-ward relationship announced in Cherokee Nation
and described above does not explain all of these canons. Indeed,
the canons gained a strong protective element in 1832, the year
after Cherokee Nation. In that year, Georgia returned to the
Supreme Court on a somewhat similar issue; this time the court
found that it had jurisdiction over the case. In Worcester v.
Georgia, a missionary appealed his conviction for living on
Cherokee lands in violation of Georgia law, which required a
permit to do so.55 Chief Justice Marshall overturned Worcester’s
conviction and used the opportunity to expound upon the
relationship between the federal government and the tribes.56 The
Cherokees, Justice Marshall said, “are under the protection of the
United States.”57 However, according to the Chief Justice, being
under federal protection did not completely take away the tribe’s
status as a distinct political entity—it retained some measure of
sovereignty over its own lands. That is, being under the protection
of the federal government “involved, practically, no claim [by the
United States] to [Indian] lands, [and] no dominion over their
persons.”58
Chief Justice Marshall further explained that “[p]rotection does
not imply the destruction of the protected” and that the whole point
of the reservation system was to ensure survival of the tribe.59 The
Chief Justice also announced that treaties should be construed in
favor of the tribe,60 a canon discussed below. He explained that it
is “reasonable to suppose, that the Indians who could not write,
and most probably could not read, who certainly were not critical

them.”).
54
E.g., San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306, 1311
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[A] clear expression of Congressional intent is necessary
before a court may construe a federal statute so as to impair tribal
sovereignty.”).
55
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 542 (1832).
56
Id. at 562.
57
Id. at 521 (emphasis added).
58
Id. at 552 (discussing a treaty with Britain but also assuming that similar
language held a similar meaning with U.S.-made treaties).
59
Id. at 552–53.
60
Id. at 582.
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judges of our language,” would not agree to treaty terms that
violated their self-determination, so treaty terms should be
understood “in the sense in which it was most obviously used [by
the tribe].”61 He went on to couch Indian treaties in familiar
federalist terms—a treaty was a grant of rights from the tribe to the
federal government, with the tribe reserving for itself all the
powers not explicitly given away.62 Chief Justice Marshall’s
reasoning echoes the Tenth Amendment.63
In many ways, Worcester used the paternalistic attitude that
Chief Justice Marshall expressed in Cherokee Nation to establish
and recognize the United States’ duty to protect the tribes, their
lands, and their sovereignty. Originally, the protection extended to
guard tribes against the individual states and the unrelenting
pressure of white intrusion on Indian lands. Over time, though, the
duty has expanded to issues including environmental, resource, and
heritage. For instance, the Native American Grave Protection and
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)64 aims to protect Indian cultural
heritage by, among other things, returning control over remains
and artifacts to Indian tribes.65
The Indian trust doctrine does not work solely through
affirmative congressional lawmaking. Indeed, the doctrine’s
canons control because “the standard principles of statutory
construction do not have their usual force in cases involving Indian
law.”66 In this way, the canons themselves give the Indian trust
doctrine teeth—the trust relationship would be meaningless if the
trust canons did not trump competing canons and prudential
values.67
For example, the Indian trust doctrine overrides the
presumption that a state holds title to the beds and banks of its
navigable water under the equal footing doctrine.68 Indeed, the
61

Id.
Id.
63
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by
this Constitution . . . are reserved to the States.”).
64
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–
3013 (2006).
65
See id. § 3002.
66
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
67
See COHEN, supra note 5, § 2.02.
68
Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1970) (holding that the
Choctaw Nation, and not Oklahoma, owns the bed of the Arkansas River); Idaho
62
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Indian trust can even override deference to agencies under
Chevron because of “the trust relationship between the United
States and the Indian American people.”69
When invoked, the Indian trust doctrine is a powerful ally to
the tribes in many circumstances. Through it, courts are able to
protect tribal interests that would otherwise be disregarded. The
remainder of this Article addresses one of those circumstances in
which the trust doctrine is particularly powerful, specifically, the
circumstance that arises when the Indian trust doctrine interacts
with federal agency guidance and activates the Principle. The
following analysis suggests that a strong understanding of the
Principle empowers tribal litigation and may extend the federal
government’s protection of tribes to cover enforcement of
nonlegislative rules.
II. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF AGENCY POLICY & GUIDANCE
This part discusses the Administrative Procedure Act,
specifically the sections that define a “rule.” Underneath the
APA’s broad umbrella, any “agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect” that “interpret[s], or
prescribe[s] law or policy” counts as a “rule.”70 However, agency
rulemaking is a broad concept and therefore lawyers typically
distinguish between legislative and nonlegislative rules. A
legislative rule is, with limited exceptions, promulgated after
undergoing a notice and comment period; it has binding legal
effect.71 A nonlegislative rule, on the other hand, does not undergo
notice and comment procedures, and typically lacks the force of
law.72 Agency policy documents are nonlegislative rules, and are
the focus of this Article. Section A discusses “normal” judicial
enforcement of nonlegislative agency guidance and policy. Section

v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 281 (2001) (holding that the Coeur D’Alene
Tribe holds title to the bed of Lake Coeur d’Alene, not Idaho).
69
Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Ramah
Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, 112 F.3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[N]ormal rules
of construction do not apply when Indian treaty rights, or even non-treaty
matters involving Indians, are at issue.”) (quotation omitted).
70
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2011).
71
See William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV.
1321, 1322 (2001).
72
Id.
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B discusses the binding guidance principle, which arises
when the Indian trust doctrine attaches to nonlegislative rules and
binds the agency to act accordingly.
A. Judicial Enforcement of Agency Policy in Typical
Circumstances
Typically, courts do not enforce nonlegislative rules because
they fall under the exception to rulemaking described in section
553 of the APA.73 Under the exception, policy documents do not
undergo notice and comment. Without notice and comment, the
documents are not legislative rules and therefore do not create
rights or duties in the public.
However, the title an agency gives a document does not end the
issue: a rule by any other name would still be a rule.74 That is, an
agency cannot promulgate a rule under cover of “guidance” to
avoid legislative rulemaking procedures. Therefore, courts test the
enforceability of a document by measuring what the document
does rather than what it is called. If a document creates rights or
duties in the public, then courts will enforce it. Otherwise, courts
generally will not.75
The Ninth Circuit developed a simple two-prong test to
differentiate between legislative (enforceable) rules and nonlegislative (not enforceable) ones. This Article uses the test
announced in United States v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclectus Parrots76
as an illustrative example for two reasons. First, the circuit
commonly applies its test to the type of nonlegislative documents
at issue in this Article.77 Second, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
this area is clearer than that of the Supreme Court’s.
Under Ninth Circuit jurisprudence, courts apply a two-part test
to determine whether an agency pronouncement may be enforced

73

5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2015). For the purposes of this Article, there is no
substantive difference between “policy” and “guidance.”
74
See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 1 (expressing this
concept rather elegantly).
75
The Indian trust exception to this “general” rule of thumb is the focus of this
Article. See supra part II.B.
76
United States v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir.
1982).
77
Other circuits either use similar logic or directly incorporate the Ninth Circuit
test. See, e.g., Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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against a federal agency. The agency’s document must both: (1)
prescribe substantive rules; and (2) conform to specific procedural
requirements.78 The first prong requires that the pronouncement in
question be “legislative in nature”—an agency’s “interpretive
rules, general statements of policy or rules of agency organization,
procedure, or practice” do not qualify as substantive.79 The second
prong examines whether the agency promulgated the
pronouncement “pursuant to a specific statutory grant of authority
and in conformance with the procedural requirements imposed by
Congress.”80
The Ninth Circuit applied this test in River Runners for
Wilderness v. Martin, which is a prime example of application
outside the Indian law context.81 There, plaintiff River Runners
challenged the National Park Service’s (NPS) 2006 decision to
allow continued use of motorized rafts in Grand Canyon National
Park.82 Plaintiffs based their claim, in part, on the fact that NPS’s
2006 decision conflicted with NPS’s then-existing policy to
maintain the wilderness qualities of the park, which would exclude
motorized travel. According to River Runners, NPS’s 2001 Park
Service Management Policy created an enforceable duty to restrict
motorized rafts in the park, and that the 2006 NPS decision to
allow such rafts was a violation of that duty.83 Therefore, the case
turned on whether the Management Policy placed a judicially
enforceable duty on the Park Service.
The court applied the Eclectus Parrots test to River Runner’s
claims, and found that the “the 2001 [NPS] [p]olicies are not
enforceable against the Park Service.”84 Under the test’s first
prong, the court noted that even NPS’s use of mandatory language
in the 2001 policies did not transform the document into a set of
substantive rules.85 Although the agency required its own
78

River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010)
(quoting the test as set forth in United States v. Fifty-Three (53) Eclectus
Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1982)).
79
Id. at 1071.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 1067.
83
Id.
84
River Runners, 593 F.3d at 1073.
85
Id. at 1071; accord Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584, 595 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (examining the same policy and finding that the “document as a whole
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adherence to the 2001 policy through the document’s
preamble, the court noted that NPS reserved the right to modify or
waive the policy as necessary.86 Therefore, the court concluded
that the policies were “not intended to have the same force” as
regulations, do not “purport to create substantive individual rights
or obligations,” and that NPS intended the policies “only to
provide guidance within the Park Service, not to establish rights in
the public generally.”87
Even though the NPS policy failed under the first prong of
Eclectus Parrots, the court also examined whether the policy
satisfied the requisite procedural requirements under the second
prong of the test. The court found it “particularly noteworthy” that
the APA required publication of substantive rules, and NPS never
published the 2001 policy in the Federal Register or the Code of
Federal Regulations.88 Therefore, outside of Indian law, even
seemingly binding language cannot create an enforceable duty
without following correct legislative rulemaking procedure under
the APA.
1. Disclaiming Language is Largely Irrelevant to Judicial
Enforceability
As illustrated in River Runners, courts take note of the type of
language agencies use in their policy documents. However, courts
do not generally consider the presence or absence of a disclaimer
within the policy document as dispositive on whether the
document is judicially enforceable or not. Indeed, it would be

does not read as a set of rules”).
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 1072 (quoting Wilderness Soc'y, 434 F.3d at 595); see also W. Radio
Servs. Co., Inc. v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896, 901 (9th Cir. 1996) (determining that two
agency documents failed the test because “[n]either is published in the Federal
Register or the Code of Federal Regulation.”); accord Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs
Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 539 (D.C. Cir.1986) (holding that “[t]he real
dividing point between regulations and general statements of policy is
publication in the Code of Federal Regulations”). Contra Davis v. Latschar, 202
F.3d 359, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that the NPS did bind itself through its
Management Policy). The court in Davis facially reached the opposite result
from River Runners. However, in Davis, the plaintiff claimed that the
Management Policies were binding, and NPS did not argue otherwise. Id.
Without briefing to the contrary, the court assumed that the Policies bound NPS.
Id. at 366.
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strange if an agency disclaimer could overcome the statutory rights
accorded to citizens by the APA—Congress’s statutory language
should control reviewability, not an agency’s disclaiming
language. Instead, courts analyze how an agency actually uses the
document in question.89
For example, the D.C. Circuit examined a document that did
not contain disclaiming language in CropLife America v. EPA.90
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) argued that the
document could not possibly be enforceable because it was only a
press release.91 However, the court evaluated whether the agency
used the document in a manner similar to a rule, rather than
evaluating the type of document or its lack of disclaiming
language.92 If an agency “self-servingly disclaims any intention to
create a rule with the ‘force of law,’ but the record indicates
otherwise,” then courts can review and enforce the document
regardless.93 Here, in spite of the document’s non-rule nature, the
court found that EPA used “clear and unequivocal language” that
“reflect[ed] an obvious change in established agency practice” and
created a “binding norm.”94 Therefore, the court held that the press
release constituted a reviewable binding regulation.95 However, the
circuit court invalidated the press release because the EPA
promulgated it without proper process.96 That the EPA
promulgated the document without notice and comment, yet still
treated it as binding, made it invalid as a rule.97
Likewise, courts do not let agencies hide behind a legal
disclaimer. In Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit
analyzed the EPA’s “Periodic Monitoring Guidance for Title V
Operating Permits Programs.”98 The EPA claimed that the
Guidance was not enforceable because it was neither final nor
89

E.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding
that an EPA guidance document carried the force and effect of law, and was
therefore judicially reviewable, even though it contained a broad disclaimer).
90
Croplife America v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
91
Id. at 881.
92
See id. at 883.
93
Id. at 883 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
94
Id. at 881.
95
Id. at 885.
96
Id. at 884–85.
97
Id. at 885.
98
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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binding.99 However, the court disagreed; the guidance
document contained statements of legal consequence, placing
obligations on both “State regulators and those they regulate.”100
Additionally, the court found the EPA’s disclaimer that the
guidance was not enforceable to be meaningless in light of the
document’s overarching purpose and effect.101
B. Atypical Circumstances: The Indian Trust Doctrine Modifies
Enforceability
Although the general rule outlined above—guidance and policy
cannot bind an agency—applies in most circumstances, outlier
cases do exist. As this Article’s introduction explained, a small line
of cases have challenged this norm. Taken together, the
foundational cases are construed, at least in the Eighth Circuit, to
require agencies to act in accordance with their policy documents
in the context of Indian law.
The first of these outlier cases was Morton v. Ruiz, decided by
the Supreme Court in 1974.102 The opinion included language
suggesting that an agency could be in violation of the Indian trust
doctrine if it failed to follow its own internal guidance.103 Indeed,
agency failure to follow its own procedure “is inconsistent with the
distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in
its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited
people.”104
In Morton, the BIA’s internal procedure called for publication
of “all directives that inform the public of privileges and benefits
available and of eligibility requirements” in the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR).105 However, the agency’s benefits manual,
which the BIA never published in the CFR as required, stated that
only Indians living “on reservations” could receive general

99

Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1023.
101
Id. at 1023 (“[T]hrough the Guidance, EPA has given the States their
‘marching orders’ and EPA expects the States to fall in line.”).
102
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
103
Id. at 235 (“Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon
agencies to follow their own procedures. This is so even where the internal
procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.”).
104
Id. at 236.
105
Id. at 235 (quotations omitted).
100
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assistance benefits from the BIA.106 Based on the benefits-manual
language, the BIA denied an Indian couple’s application for
assistance because they lived several miles from the reservation’s
border. Because the benefits manual had not been published
according to the internal procedure, the Court held that the BIA’s
“on reservation” requirement was invalid because it “amount[ed]
to an unpublished ad hoc determination . . . that was not
promulgated in accordance with [BIA’s] own procedures.”107
In Morton, the BIA’s “on reservation” requirement failed for
two reasons. First, the eligibility requirement failed because a
legislative rule would have been more appropriate to the BIA’s
purpose.108 Because the Indian plaintiffs identified an underlying
statutory duty, the Court could have struck down the BIA’s denial
of benefits under the APA on that basis alone, without reaching the
issue of BIA’s additional consultation procedure.
Although the Court could have stopped there, it also addressed
a second and more important consultation analysis. The Court
recognized that the BIA’s internal guidance policy—requiring that
the BIA publish eligibility requirements in the CFR—was a
procedural requirement additional to the baseline requirements of
the APA.109 Accordingly, the “on reservation” requirement
additionally failed because the BIA disregarded its own
guidance.110 Essentially, the Court reasoned that it could hold the
agency to a higher standard than the APA required because of the
Indian trust doctrine.111 The BIA violated the Indian trust doctrine
when it failed to follow its own guidance because that guidance
created an expectation (of a particular process) in the Indian
community.
The Eighth Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s lead in
106

Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
Id. at 236.
108
See id. at 236 (“The conscious choice of the Secretary not to treat this
extremely significant eligibility requirement, affecting rights of needy Indians,
as a legislative-type rule, renders it ineffective . . . .”).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 235 (“[I]t is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures . .
. even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise
would be required.”).
111
The Court did not use the term “Indian trust doctrine,” but it grounded its
reasoning in the same principles intrinsic to the trust doctrine, like dependency
and exploitation. See id. at 235–36.
107
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Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus.112 There, the Eighth
Circuit relied on the Morton precedent in its holding and explained
that, when the BIA failed to follow its own Indian consultation
policy, it violated the trust doctrine. The court held that “[f]ailure
of the Bureau to make any real attempt to comply with its own
policy of consultation not only violates those general principles
which govern administrative decision making, but also violates
‘the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government
in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited
people.’”113
In Oglala Sioux, the BIA removed a reservation’s Agency
Superintendent because of a conflict of interest that arose when the
Superintendent’s brother became the Tribe’s president.114 The BIA
neglected to consult with the Tribe when it removed and replaced
the Superintendent.115 The removal contradicted the BIA’s tribal
consultation policy, which provided that “(t)ribes should be
consulted on recommendations for selection of employees for the
position of Agency Superintendent.”116 The Oglala Sioux court
focused on the idea that the BIA’s consultation policy created and
supported the Tribe’s expectation of additional procedure, namely
that the Tribe would be an active participant in personnel
decisions.117 The court also focused on the procedural aspect of the
guidance despite the fact that it was a nonlegislative rule.118 The
court held that the BIA violated its own guidelines by making a
personnel change without conducting meaningful consultation and
remanded the decision so that consultation could take place.119
Conversely, other circuits have declined to adopt the Oglala
Sioux precedent. For example, in Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a district court
ruling that cited to Oglala Sioux in support of the proposition that
112

Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 721 (quoting Morton, 415 U.S. 199).
114
Id. at 710–11.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 717-18 (quotation omitted).
117
Id. at 721 (stating that the BIA “failed to comply with its own procedures”
and “[f]ail[ed] . . . to comply with its own policy” in the same paragraph).
118
Id.
119
Id. at 714 (“We also agree that the Bureau's action was procedurally defective
in that it was not made in accordance with the Bureau's own procedure requiring
prior consultation with the Tribe.”).
113
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the BIA’s consultation guidelines bound the agency.120 On review,
the Ninth Circuit distinguished the Eighth Circuit precedent: in
Oglala Sioux, the BIA conceded the binding nature of the
consultation guidelines; in Hoopa Valley, the BIA did not.121
Despite Hoopa Valley, the line of cases supporting the
assertion that the Indian trust doctrine renders agency policy
enforceable continues to grow. Examples that are more recent can
be found in the Eighth Circuit, where a number of decisions follow
the Oglala Sioux precedent. For example, the United States District
Court for the District of South Dakota explicitly rejected the Ninth
Circuit’s Hoopa Valley decision and affirmed on different facts
that the BIA’s consultation policy bound the agency to bring an
effected tribe into its decision making process.122
In that case, Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, the BIA made
personnel changes that affected the Tribe without following its
own tribal consultation policy.123 The Deer court reviewed a
thorough history of the BIA’s consultation procedures, including
Consultation Guidelines, letters to the tribes, and a clarifying order,
which stated, “[b]ureaus and offices are required to consult with
the recognized tribal government.”124 Based on that welldeveloped record, the court decided that, “[c]learly, [the personnel
decision] in question falls within these policies of consultation and
solicitation of advice.”125 Therefore, the court held that the “BIA is
not to be permitted to disavow its own policies and directives.”126
Even more recently, the United States District Court for the
District of South Dakota required consultation with the plaintiff
tribe, but found that duty to be present in a policy document and in

120

Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 F.2d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1103 (“The [agency guidelines] are not conceded by the Bureau to have
the force of law, in contrast to the governmental concession made in Oglala
Sioux.”).
122
See Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, 911 F. Supp. 395, 399 (D.S.D. 1995)
(quoting Oglala Sioux’s holding). See also Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v.
Babbitt, 915 F. Supp. 157 (D.S.D. 1996) (holding that BIA has the discretion to
terminate employees, but must consult with tribe first).
123
Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, 911 F. Supp. 395 (D.S.D. 1995).
124
Id. at 399.
125
Id. at 398.
126
Id. at 400 (explicitly rejecting the Ninth Circuits distinction in Hoopa
Valley); accord Winnebago, 915 F. Supp. at 168 (finding the same result on
“substantially similar” facts).
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the applicable statute.127 In this case, the district court
enjoined the BIA from conducting a school restructuring plan
without first consulting the affected Tribe.128 The court framed the
consultation obligation as follows: “Where the BIA has established
a policy requiring prior consultation with a tribe, and therefore
created a justified expectation that the tribe will receive a
meaningful opportunity to express its views before policy is made,
that opportunity must be given.”129 This is powerful language.
III. DISTILLATION AND APPLICATION
This analysis begins by examining selected points from the
jurisprudence discussed above. Section A condenses those points
into a succinct statement of the binding guidance principle and
then applies the Principle to the EPA’s EJ policy in section B.
Finally, it suggests that Indian tribes should leverage the Principle
to render the EJ policy, or other similar policy documents,
judicially enforceable.
A. Distillation of a Useful Rule
As shown through the cases discussed in Part II.B, the Eighth
Circuit holds at least some agencies accountable to their Indian
consultation polices. Two common themes in these cases are worth
noting. First, many of the cases involve situations where the
affected tribe also had an independent statutory ground for review,
such as underlying violation of the APA. This Article takes the
position that an underlying violation is helpful, but not necessary
for application of the Principle. Although an underlying statutory
violation seems to make a case’s outcome more certain, when
courts review a policy standing alone, like in Lower Brule Sioux,
they may still hold agencies accountable.
Second, the BIA is generally the acting agency when courts
apply the Principle, which may carry an inherent bias in the courts.
For example, the BIA’s mission statement suggests a clearly
delineated interaction between the agency and Indian tribes, an
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Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Kempthorne, 442 F. Supp. 2d 774, 785 (D.S.D.
2006).
128
Id. at 785.
129
Id. at 784 (citing Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, 911 F. Supp. 395 (D.S.D.
1995).
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interaction that does not explicitly exist in other agencies. In fact,
the BIA’s mission statement embodies the Indian trust doctrine
itself: “The Bureau of Indian Affairs’ mission is to enhance the
quality of life, to promote economic opportunity, and to carry out
the responsibility to protect and improve the trust assets of
American Indians, Indian tribes and Alaska Natives.”130
However, no court’s opinion treats the BIA as a “special”
agency under the Principle, and there is no statutory basis for such
differentiation under the APA. This Article takes the position that
the Indian trust doctrine, and thus the binding guidance principle,
applies to the federal government as a whole, not only to individual
agencies. Therefore, this Article separates the component parts and
takes a broad view of the binding guidance principle’s potential
applicability.
Taken as a whole, Part II.B shows that Indian tribes have a
valid cause of action in the Eighth Circuit to make agencies follow
their own tribal consultation policies. The key question that arises
then is whether disaggregation of the binding guidance principle
allows tribes to expand its applicability beyond just the BIA. That
is, do the underlying tenets of the binding guidance principle
constrain it to a narrow scope, or are they broad enough to
encompass and protect other tribal interests?
To answer that question, this Article collates the Eighth Circuit
jurisprudence into discrete elements. The courts do not articulate
any particular test, but a workable paraphrase of their reasoning
hinges on the question of whether the agency’s consultation policy
actually creates an expectation of meaningful interaction between a
given Tribe and an agency. For example, the BIA’s consultation
guidelines speak specifically about personnel changes; Indians
could reasonably understand such language to give them the right
to consult with the BIA, not just the possibility.
The powerful language in Yankton Sioux illustrates the broader
applicability of the Principle: “Where the BIA has established a
policy requiring prior consultation with a tribe, and therefore
created a justified expectation that the tribe will receive a
meaningful opportunity to express its views before policy is made,
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Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/BIA/ (Dec. 10, 2013).
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that opportunity must be given.”131 To the court and the
tribes, the operative elements in that passage are not the BIA and
consultation, but that a tribe has justified expectation of a
meaningful opportunity to affect policy decisions.
The binding guidance principle stands for the proposition that
consultation is meaningless unless tribal input actually affects
substantive decisions as is common amongst procedural
requirements. For example, the comment procedures of legislative
rulemaking assure “that the agency will have before it the facts and
information relevant to a particular administrative problem, as well
as suggestions for alternative solutions.”132 Likewise, the National
Environmental Policy Act does not “mandate particular results,”
but it does require consideration of “relevant environmental
information.”133 Similarly, the binding guidance principle
incorporates the Indian trust doctrine’s protectionist values by
making sure that Indian tribes can take an active role in the
decision making process—a meaningful opportunity means that
tribes can help protect themselves.
Combining the above concepts with Eighth Circuit
jurisprudence results in a three-part test:
1. Does the Indian trust doctrine apply set of facts?
2. Does an agency policy or guidance document address
this particular situation?
3. Does the document create a justified expectation of
certain treatment?
If all three are met, then the Principle applies, the document is
judicially enforceable, and the agency must follow its own
guidance or face a court order mandating that it do so.134
B. Applying the Rule to Environmental Justice
EPA’s EJ Policy consists of fifty-three pages and lays out the
agency’s thoughts on the environmental issues that face low131

Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Kempthorne, 442 F. Supp. 2d 774, 785 (D.S.D.
2006).
132
Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
133
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
134
The expression might be written as: federal Indian trust common law +
policy document + justified expectation = judicial enforcement of the policy.
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income and minority communities.135 The EPA understands that
disadvantaged populations often bear a disproportionate
environmental burden and expressly includes indigenous
populations among the disadvantaged groups. More specifically,
according to the EJ, an explicit concern is the “actual or potential
lack of fair treatment or meaningful involvement of . . . tribes in the
development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental
laws, regulations, and policies.”136
Accordingly, the EJ Policy shows many similarities with
Indian-specific consultation policies. For example, the “meaningful
involvement” language in the EJ Policy mirrors the “meaningful
and timely input” language used in the BIA’s tribal consultation
policy.137 On the other hand, the EJ policy uses soft non-binding
language: the EJ document “helps rule writers understand and
identify potential EJ concerns.”138 The EJ Policy also includes an
explicit disclaimer that it “is not legally enforceable.”139 However,
as discussed above, soft and disclaiming languages are not likely to
control.
As a test, let us hypothetically assume that the EPA has taken
some action that violates its EJ Policy by placing a
disproportionate environmental burden on an Indian tribe and
failing to meaningfully involve the tribe.140 Assume that the tribe
then challenged the EPA’s action in court, first under the “normal”
analysis of the Ninth Circuit and then under the binding guidance
principle of the Eighth Circuit.
Assessing the EJ Policy under the normal framework shows
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EJ POLICY, supra note 4.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
137
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT
CONSULTATION POLICY § B.3 (2000),
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc-002000.pdf; see also
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA POLICY ON CONSULTATION AND
COORDINATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES § II (2011),
http://www.epa.gov/tp/pdf/cons-and-coord-with-indian-tribes-policy.pdf.
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EJ POLICY, supra note 4, at ii (emphasis added).
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Id.
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EPA does have its own tribal consultation policy. See BUREAU OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS, supra note 137. EPA does not always consult tribes. This situation
might arise, for instance, when a tribe intervenes in a suit between EPA and a
state or private party. When the tribe holds a tertiary interest in EPA’s action,
the EJ Policy is a more on-point guidance document. Comparative analysis of
the two is beyond the scope of this Article.
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that a court would not force EPA compliance with the EJ
Policy. It certainly fails the first prong of the Eclectus Parrots test
because it constitutes a general statement of agency policy rather
than a substantive rule.141 Further, the EPA did not produce the EJ
Policy in conformance with the legislative rulemaking
requirements of the APA, nor did it publish the EJ Policy in the
CFR. Therefore, the EJ Policy fails the second prong of the
Eclectus Parrots test as well—the EJ Policy does not conform to
the procedural requirements of legislative rulemaking imposed by
Congress. Therefore, a reviewing court would not remand the
EPA’s action and force tribal involvement under the normal test.
Further, in the typical situation addressed here, the procedural
requirements imposed by Congress through the APA means that
any plaintiff asserting that the EJ Policy created an enforceable
duty would also be asserting that the EPA promulgated the EJ
Policy improperly. In fact, to argue that the EJ Policy is binding is
necessarily to argue that it should have undergone official APA
rulemaking. Even if a plaintiff successfully argued that the Policy
created an enforceable duty, a court would strike down the EJ
Policy as improperly promulgated.142
Now, let us assume that the tribe brought a cause of action that
relied on the Indian trust doctrine. Applying the new test extracted
above yields a result different from the normal test:
1. Does the Indian trust doctrine apply? Yes, this is an Indian
tribe bringing suit in federal court, so the trust doctrine
applies.
2. Does an agency policy document address this situation?
Yes, the EJ Policy states that indigenous communities
should not carry a disproportionate environmental cost and
should also be part of the decision making process.
3. Does the document create a justified expectation of certain
treatment? Yes, the EJ Policy states both that the tribe
should receive fair treatment in comparison to other
groups, and that the tribe should be meaningfully involved
in the agency’s action.
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See supra Part II.A.
See, e.g., CropLife Am. v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (addressing
this very situation) (discussed in part II.A.2).
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This new test focuses on the substance of the expectation
created, whether it was justified or not. When the Principle is
applied to a document, the disclaimer and promulgation procedure
fade into obscurity. Indeed, the Principle binds the EPA to the
proffered purpose of the EJ policy: to “act consistently with the
federal trust responsibility when taking actions that affect
tribes.”143 Therefore, how the EPA promulgated the EJ Policy
makes no difference under the binding guidance principle.
However, the justified expectation of meaningful tribal
involvement does.

CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to distill a new theory—the binding
guidance principle—from the case law. Under some
circumstances, the Indian trust doctrine attaches to agency policy
and guidance documents and makes them judicially enforceable
when they would not be otherwise. This forms the substance of the
Principle.
At this time, this narrow the Principle exists within the Eighth
Circuit and has been applied in only limited circumstances.
However, deeper analysis of the Principle suggests that it need not
be construed so narrowly because its foundations build on broad
concepts of general applicability. In this way, tribes have a viable
and non-frivolous way to make agencies adhere to their own
guidance documents. Moreover, agencies do not always act in the
way their own guidance documents suggest—that is a good thing.
It is at least possible, if not likely, that a concentrated effort
could expand the Principle both within the Eighth Circuit and to
other circuits. One can easily imagine tribal interest in holding
various agencies to any number of their policies, whether in terms
of environmental justice or otherwise. I hope that this Article is
useful to those ends.
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